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How to be Philosophical about the End of the Aeneid
KARL GALINSKY
Overemphasized as it has been over the past three decades, the final scene
of the Aeneid is a useful paradigm both of Rezeptionsgeschichte and of
Vergil's poetic technique. There is no indication whatever that Vergil's
non-Christian, Roman readers viewed it in terms of Aeneas' condemnation,
and Vergil certainly had his share of critics.* It is writers like Lactantius
who criticized Aeneas' furor and ira even while justifying the ira Dei
elsewhere.2 In the course of the following centuries, the issue was obviated
by the increasing emphasis on just the first six books of the Aeneid, and the
vision of Aeneas as a good proto-Christian and textbook Stoic gained a firm
hold. Quite anachronistically, he was made out to be totally different from
the other heroes of antiquity and to sublimate his every emotion. In two
words: sanctus Aeneas, the pilgrim progressing from furor (bad) to
pietas (good).
It is understandable, though it still is bad scholarship, that any revision
of this distorted characterization would cast his martial and spirited
behavior in Aeneid 7-12 as a virtual fall from grace. The conceptual
framework was not changed, but simply inverted. The Stoic saint was
scrutinized by the Inquisition, found wanting, and in the end was
demonized; I give interpreters like Michael Putnam credit for doing so
forthrightly^ instead of resorting to the usual muttering
—
mussat rex ipse
academicus—about "dark aspects," "troubling ambivalences," and the like.
The point is that one skewed orthodoxy replaced the other; the only virtue
of the inane "optimism vs. pessimism" sobriquet was that it appropriately
reflected the parochialism and superficiality of the controversy.
^ For a collection of some of the evidence—^as opposed to circumstantial speculations—see,
e.g., H. Georgii, Die antike Aeneiskritik aus den Scholien und anderen Quellen hergestellt
(Stuttgart 1891; repr. Hildesheim 1971).
^ Inst. 5. 10. 1-11; see A. Wlosok, Res humanae—res divinae: Kleine Schriften, ed. by E.
Heck and E. A. Schmidt (Heidelberg 1990) 437-44, cf. 412 ff.; W. Suerbaum, VergU Aeneis.
Beitrdge zu ihrer Rezeption: Geschichte und Gegenwart (Bamberg 1981) 105 ff. In the
Johannls of Corippus, however, martial fervor, rage, and slaughtering are standard attributes of
the Christian protagonists; its ending, though fragmentary, contains echoes of that of the
Aeneid: poenas dat (8. 647), Romani militis ira (8. 649), fervidus (8. 654).
^ See, most recently, his "Anger, Blindness and Insight in Virgil's Aeneid." Apeiron 23.4
(1990) 7-39.
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The resulting reductionisms did little justice to the Aeneid, a unique and
experimental epic that is highly complex without being diffuse. It was
against this background that I discussed, a few years ago, the poem's final
scene in terms of ancient views of anger.'* I wrote the article to open up the
debate, and not to close it. 1 wrote it because the current orthodoxy took a
totally reductionist view of a complex human emotion, a one-sidedness that
is validated neither in antiquity nor in modem psychology.^ The timing was
fortuitous: A new edition of Philodemus' De Ira appeared shortly
thereafter, spurring more discussions of the Epicurean view of anger and its
relevance to the Aeneid.^ It is useful, therefore, to return to the topic and
combine it with some other perspectives.
Before doing so, I want to make another essential point: It is typical of
Vergil that he ends his epic on a complex issue that was one of the most
intensely debated at his time, as we know from contemporary sources.
Vergil's poetry is so great and so existential precisely because he takes on
such topics and because he deals with them honestly, and not just to provide
happy endings. A further reason for that greatness is the deliberate
involvement of the reader. There is a constant dialogue some of which can
be usefully accommodated within the hermeneutic of Michael Bakhtin,
although there are some specific differences, too."^ Vergil knows there are
different viewpoints on anger and readers may respond differently, but he
does not leave things diffuse or ambiguous in the sense of an aporia.
Instead, this so-called ambiguity is really a means to have the reader work
through a multiplicity, an authorially intended multiplicity, of alternatives
and nuances, so that the poet's intentions may be understood all the better.
Let me be specific.
The death of Tumus comes as no surprise. It has been assiduously
prepared for* and it is inevitable: Tumus has violated a sacred treaty—for
good reason the whole treaty scene is drawn out the way it is in Book 12
—
* "The Anger of Aeneas." AJP 109 (1988) 321^8.
^ To the modem works now add J. Horder, Provocation and Responsibility (Oxford 1992), a
study concerned with the role of anger in legal history; the influence of Aristotle stands out.
* G. Indelli (ed.). Filodemo. Lira (Naples 1988); cf. his new edition, with R. Laurenti, of
Plutarch's Sul controllo dell'ira (Naples 1988). Also, J. Annas, "Epicurean Emotions," GRBS
30 (1989) 145-64; M. Erler, "Orthodoxie und Anpassung." MH 49 (1992) 171-200 and "Der
Zom des Helden. Philodems 'De Ira' und Vergils Konzept des Zoms in der 'Aeneis'," GB 18
(1992) 103-26; J. Procope, "Epicureans on Anger," in G. W. Most et al. (eds.). Philanlhropia
kai Eusebeia: FestschriftfOr Albrecht Dihle zum 70. Geburtstag (Gottingen 1994) 364-86. Cf.
R. Rieks, Affekie und Strukluren: Pathos als Form- und Wirkprinzip von Vergils Aeneis,
Zetemata 86 (Munich 1989) passim and esp. 38 f. An annotated English translation of
Philodemus' De Ira is being prepared by my colleague David Armstrong (as part of the NEH-
funded Philodemus Project), to whom I am grateful for several points of advice and for
permission to use his translation. There is no detailed discussion of Philodemus' treatise in M.
C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton
1994), although "anger is ... the central topic of this book and its raison d'etre" (508).
''
Cf. J. FarreU. "Which Aeneid in Whose Nineties?" VergUius 36 (1990) 78-80.
* See, most recently, E. Potz, "Pius furor und der Tod des Tumus," Gynmasium 99 (1992)
248-62.
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and there was no dementia for this kind of transgression in Rome. The
usual objection is that Vergil should have made this clear in the final scene;
instead, Aeneas kills Turnus in a flash of rage over Pallas. Two quick
points: One is the implied reader. Great poems tend to be written not by
professors or scholiasts but by poets, and it would be totally pedestrian to
spell out again what happened on the day the action of Book 12 takes place.
You do not have to be Wolfgang Iser to realize that the readers know all
this—it is really quite fresh in their memory—and the facts do not have to
be recapitulated. Servius fills that gap for us, as schoohnasters always do:
Turnus dies, he says, because of ultio foederis rupti (12. 949). Second
point: What is the alternative to Vergil's humanization of an ineluctable
outcome? To have Aeneas be totally unemotional, read the verdict to
Turnus from Mommsen's Strafrecht, and then solemnly kill him?
My favorite for this kind of behavior modification is the recent
argument that Hercules in Book 8 should not display rage. Instead, he
should fight against the monster Cacus like a Stoic hero.' One wonders how
that would work. Should Hercules go into that cave like a robot reading
Zeno, or perhaps a few Stoic paradoxes? I am afraid we do not even find
that kind of Stoic orthodoxy in Lucan, who has his good guy Pompey
invoke ultio, poena, and the ira vindicis patriae in Book 2 (531-40). His
speech follows an episode which is almost a take-off on the Aeneid's final
scene; i.e., Caesar grants dementia to Domitius, who is angry {iras) with
him for doing so—he prefers the furores of war (2. 507-25). All this
—
Hercules' angry struggle, Pompey 's wrath, Aeneas' /wror and ira—raises
another perspective and exemplifies precisely the sort of process of thinking
and working things through in which the many layers of Vergil's poetry
always involve the reader: Heroes get angry. It is a heroic emotion. Do not
expect a martial epic without an angry hero. To apply the many Stoic
bromides we find in Cicero—and his mockery of doctrinaire Stoics is clear
from his characterization of Cato in Pro Murena^^—to the situation that has
been carefully contrived at the end of the Aeneid is a dogmatic exercise that
ignores non-Stoic views and the notion of appropriateness. What the
popular philosophies say is that you should not be irascible over everyday
stuff with your wife, kids, and neighbors. All, except for the Stoics, realize
there is a rightful place for that emotion and that it can be channelled into
righteous actions.
If I have been mimicking the diatribe of Hellenistic and Roman popular
philosophers, it is for good reason: The first part of Philodemus' De Ira (I-
XXXIII) in many ways is a deliberate take-off on Stoic and Cynic
' Putnam (above, note 3) 30-32.
^° Mur. 60-66. Even in a more serious vein, Cicero, following Zeno and Chrysippus, denied
that an actually existing true Stoic sage had yet been found (Jusc. 2. 51); to present Aeneas as
such would have been unreal. Cf. De Or. 1. 220-24.
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diatribes.'* Philodemus' relevance to Vergil needs no further comment,
especially since the publication of a papyrus fragment with Vergil's name
which comes from one of Philodemus* ethical treatises directed against a
dissident Epicurean, Nicasicrates.'^ Nicasicrates' views are also one of the
main targets of De Ira; that very fact, quite relevant to any assessment of
anger in the Aeneid, shows that it would be wrong to speak even of an
Epicurean orthodoxy—not surprisingly, there were divergent views of so
cardinal an emotion even within one philosophical school.*^ For these
reasons, it is useful to explore the applicability of Philodemus' treatise to
the Aeneid somewhat further; besides, I would have little to add to what I
said about the Stoics and Peripatetics in the earlier article. Several points of
relevance stand out.
Anger was viewed as a highly differentiated phenomenon. It is another
instance where the blunderbuss approach of defining Vergil's poetry mostly
by connecting verbal repetitions falls down because it tends to ignore
shifting aspects of the same phenomenon. In plain English, each instance of
furor is not the same, nor should we insist on the poet's having to use
protreptic epithets Uke iustus to designate such shifts. In attempting to stake
out some middle ground between the Stoics, who condemned anger, and the
Peripatetics, who were very liberal in its defense, the Epicureans engaged in
what Julia Annas has aptly called "persuasive redefinition": They do not
use new terms for a phenomenon like anger, but they employ the common
ones in new, distinctive ways and contexts.*"* It should be noted how
congenial this practice is both to Augustan classicism—witness Agrippa's
characterization of Vergil as "novae cacozeliae repertorem, non tumidae nee
exilis, sed ex communibus verbis, atque ideo latentis"*^—and to the Roman
use of language, where words take on multiple meanings instead of new
words being created for each new meaning.*^
The issue is directly related to the genesis of the Epicurean debate
about anger. Epicurus, it seems, had made some broad pronouncements on
" A point I owe Professor Annstrong, who will illustrate it more fully in his forthcoming
English edition. Cf. Annas (above, note 6) 145 f., with reference to the mention of Bion's On
Anger at col. 1, fr. 17.
'^ M. Gigante and M. Capasso. "II ritomo di VirgUio a Eroolano." SIFC 7 (1989) 3-6. V.
Mellinghoff-Bourgerie, Les incertitudes de Virgile: Contributions ipicuriennes a la thiologie
de VEniide, Collection Latomus 210 (Brussels 1990) is an interesting attempt to explore
Vergil's Epicurean sensibilities in the Aeneid.
^' Cf. F. Longo Auricchio and A. Tepido Guerra, "Aspetti e problemi della dissidenza
epicurea," CErc 1 1 (1981) 25-40; Annas (above, note 6) 164; Erler, "Orthodoxie" (above, note
6) 178 ff.
'* Annas (above, note 6) 147, with n. 6
'' Donatus, Vita Verg. 180-83. Even if uttered in jest, the remark had its share of verun%
see W. Gorier in H. Flashar (ed.), Le classicisme d Rome aux lers siecles avant et apres J.-C,
Entretiens Fond. Hardt25 (Vandoeuvres-Geneve 1979) 175-202.
'^ Good discussion by W. Neuhauser, "Ambiguilas als Wesenszug der lateinischen
Sprache," Innsbr. Beitr. zur Kulturwissenschaft 17 (1972) 237-58. The result is not
"ambiguity" in the sense of "indeterminacy"; cf. T. Bahti in Camp. Lit. 38 (1986) 9-23.
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the subject that occasioned different definitions. "In fact, Epicurus makes
clear in his Anaphoneseis that the sage will experience 0\))j,6<; and that he
will experience it in moderation" (XLV 5-8; cf. XLIII 41 and XLVI 1).
This is different both from "being enraged" QQJW 20 ff.) and from 0d^6<; as
an impulse to revenge if revenge is lust for revenge and pleasurable; Uiis
latter disposition is ^avCa (XLIV). "For the merciless man, as Homer (//. 9.
63) says, is 'tribeless and lawless' and genuinely 'is in love with war' and
vengeance on mankind, but the wise man is most merciful and most
reasonable" (XLIV 22-27). There are different kinds of &u^6<;, then, and,
to an even larger extent, this is true of opyn.
About the main issue there was no doubt: The wise man does
experience anger (XLVI 12) and "will be liable to certain fits of anger"
(XLI 30). Anger is part of human nature: "It cannot be escaped and is
called 'natural' for that reason" (XXXIX 29-31). "Fits of rage happen to
good men, if someone is wronging their friends" (XLI 17-19). But there is
plenty of nuance. The anger of the sophos, therefore, is not the same as
everybody's anger.
The basic distinction Philodemus makes is that between "natural"
((p\)oucn) and "empty" (kevt|) anger (opyn). It is bound up with another
differentiauon (XXXVII 23-XXXVIII 22):
We [Epicureans] do not make any unitary pronouncement, but we teach
that the emotion, taken in isolation and per se, is an evil, since it is painful
or resembles what is painful, but taken in conjunction with one's character
(5id0eaiq) as a whole it is something that can even be called a good, as we
think; for it results [when good] from an examination of what the nature of
states of affairs really is and from a completely true perception in our
comparative estimation of the damage done and in our punishments of
those who damage us. So that in the same way we call the pointless kind
of anger (kevtiv opyriv) an evil, because it results from a worthless
disposition (nanTcovT|po\) SiaGeoeocx;) of character and entails all sorts of
further troubles, one must call the natural («jn)aiKf|v) kind of anger a non-
evil, but, as it is something painful . . . [just as, when it results from] a
good (artouSaiaq) [disposition], it is not an evil thing, but even a good, so
also we will call an evil the refusal to accept the natural kind of anger.
The distinction between natural and empty anger is akin to that made
by Epicurus between natural and empty desires.^^ An empty desire, for
instance, resulting in empty anger is the belief that retaliation should be
enjoyable for its own sake (XLII 22-34). In opposition, Philodemus states
that (a) anger in general is painful rather than pleasant and (b) retaliation
and punishment are not enjoyable (ti5v)); these are some of the conditions
that meet the criterion of the "natural" anger displayed by the sophos: "(He
is not) impelled to his revenge as to something enjoyable—because it has
nothing pleasurable to offer him—but he approaches it as something most
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necessary and most unpleasurable, as he would the drinking of apsinthion or
the doctor's knife" (XLIV 15-22). Anger does not exist so that we may get
a "hft, so to speak, from being angry, but merely regards fulfilling the desire
to retaliate as something that has to be done."^* Empty anger, by contrast,
leads only to further follies and complications (XXXVIII 1-60; XL 7-19).
The aim of Philodemus is to give practical, common-sense advice. It is
wrong or "empty" habitually to engage in anger. Anger should be short and
not sweet, and it should serve the purpose of retaliation not for its own sake
but because some punishment needs to be transacted. All this is connected
with the disposition, the 6id9Eoiq, of the individual. Someone with a
7ia|i7t6vTipo(; bioQeoic, will be possessed of habitual anger leading to "a
myriad of further troubles" (XXXVin 5-6). The wise man, by contrast, has
OTtovSaia 6id0eaiq and will accept and engage in anger for good reason
and only for so long. An ironic consequence can be that the person who is
not angry by disposition (dopyriToq) may come across, when angry, as even
angrier than the habitually irascible individual (XXXIV 31-XXXV 5):
But generally we may suppose that a person genuinely not irascible will
not give a prolonged impression of irascibility, or if he does he will not be
profoundly (enraged) but just not the sort of person he seems. At any rate
they appear to that extent (irascible) even when their disposition is quite
opposite, so that even the wise man, for instance Epicurus even, made this
sort of impression on some . .
.
The relevance of all this to the role of Aeneas' and, for that matter,
Turnus' anger in the Aeneid is so obvious that its needs minimal
commentary. Before providing it, I want to reemphasize an important point
There was no monolithic dogma about anger in the Hellenistic ethical
philosophies taken as a whole. Philodemus' own discussion is heuristic
rather than doctrinaire; it reflects an intelligent and searching attempt to
come to grips with an important issue without being dogmatic. Hence De
Ira is sometimes "baffling, and difficult even to construe ... for it shows us
Philodemus adjusting to a changing philosophical climate,"^ ^ and,
specifically, trying to adapt Epicurean thought to the Roman mentality; for
good reason, Erler views him as the Epicurean equivalent to Panaetius.^"
When we add to this Vergil's own eclecticism we should not expect the poet
of the Aeneid, therefore, to provide a mere textbook illustration of every
viewpoint expressed in De Ira. The salient issue is that the horizon of
expectation of Vergil's audience went ever so far beyond simple reUance on
Stoicism.
** Annas (above, note 6) 162, who points out, in this connection, that the anger of Achilles
would not meet that standard.
^' Annas (above, note 6) 145; Indelli's commentary certainly bears this out. Cf. Procop6
(above, note 6) 367 f. on the nature of Philodemus' treatise.
^ Erier, "Orlhodoxie" (above, note 6) passim.
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What we can expect and must concentrate on, therefore, is not the
absence of anger in Aeneas, but its modification. In essence, the
methodological principle is no different from that which we use for all
things Roman, i.e. the adaptation and modulation especially of Greek forms
of culture or of any predecessors in general. We do not expect a Roman
temple to look totally different from its Greek predecessors. Rather, the
significance lies in the modifications. They are obvious in Aeneas' case.
His anger is not habitual and therefore "empty." It does not amount to
mania; Vergil underlines the distinction by using insania only to
characterize Tumus and Mezentius.^^ While Aeneas' rage can be absolutely
Homeric, as in his killing spree in Book 10,^^ the instances of modification
of Aeneas' behavior are unprecedented for the hero of a martial epic: e.g.,
his reluctance to fight Lausus and his reaction to Lausus' death, both
deliberately contrasting with Tumus' treatment of Pallas; his injunction, o
cohibete irasl after the breach of thcfoedus (12. 314); and his hesitation
before killing Tumus, "an extraordinary moment of humanity; for the epic
warrior never hesitates. "^^ As for Aeneas' display of anger at the end of the
epic, it is the "good" anger that "results from an examination of what the
nature of states of affairs really is and from a completely true perception in
our comparative estimation of the damage done and in our punishments of
those who damage us" (XXXVII 32-39). Hence Propertius, in his praise of
the virtues of Italy (3. 22), can aptly say that Rome, who is better at
forthright warfare than suited for "injurious acts" (it is certainly legitimate
to think of the breaking of agreements and treaties), does not have to be
ashamed of her history, "because we Romans stand strong as much by the
sword as by pietas: Anger tempers the victorious hands" (19-22):
armis apta magis tellus quam commoda noxae:
famam, Roma, tuae, non pudet historiae.
nam quantum ferro, tantum pietate potentes
stamus: victrices temperat ira manus.
What seems at first sight paradoxical, if we subscribe to one-dimensional
notions of ira, tums out to make excellent sense in the context of the
Epicurean discussion of anger and of the Aeneid's final scene: It is not
2» Tumus: 7. 461; 12. 37. 667. Mezenlius: 10. 871. Ignored, with much else, by M. R.
Wright, "Ferox Virtus: Anger in the Aeneid," in S. Braund and C. Gill (eds.), The Passions in
Roman Thought and Literature (Cambridge 1995) chapter 10.
Even here a Roman component is not missing: While Livy suppresses atrocities
committed by the Roman army (as in 7. 10. 10 f. and 33. 10. 3; see P. G. Walsh. "Livy's
Preface and the Distortion of History," AJP 76 [1955] 369-83), Vergil is far too realistic to do
the same. To call this "befremdend" (V. Poschl. in 2000 Jahre Vergil: Ein Symposion,
Wolfenbiitteler Forschungen 24 [Wiesbaden 1983] 175-88) is the usual application of an
anachronistic cultural norm that ignores the alterity of works like the Aeneid.
^ W. Clausen. Virgil's Aeneid and the Tradition ofHellenistic Poetry (Berkeley 1987) 99.
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dementia that restrains the Romans in victory, but anger—the right kind, of
course. Such anger, in fact, is a manifestation ofpietas.^
A central point of agreement even amidst conflicting Epicurean views
of anger seems to have been that anger should not be pleasurable for its own
sake. It is a painful emotion, and that is very much the way the final scene
of the Aeneid is cast Aeneas does not gloat; the contrast is deliberate not
only with Achilles' conquest of Hector, but also with Tumus' of Pallas (10.
500): "quo nunc Tumus ovat spolio gaudetque potitus," followed, of course,
by Vergil's editorializing comments that foreshadow the end of the epic.
Nor is there any indication that Aeneas' anger will be long-Uved. Since it is
so emphatic, however, and precisely because it is not an ingrained
characteristic of Aeneas, it can also lead to the perception that Philodemus
astutely observed, i.e. "a person genuinely not irascible" appearing as even
more irascible than the habitual offenders when he has a fit of anger
(XXXIV 31-XXXV 5). It is not Aeneas' usual behavior and therefore it
seems all the starker. The Epicurean Philodemus, a good judge of people,
made due allowance for it and used the proper perspective. One wishes that
Aeneas' modem critics had done likewise.
In sum, the alignment is virtually complete between Aeneas' behavior
and Philodemus' postulate that the wise man should approach revenge "as
something most necessary"
—
Pallas te immolat—"and unpleasurable"
—
saevi monimenta doloris—and that, in contrast to the "tribeless and lawless"
Homeric warrior, "the wise man is most merciful and most reasonable
(EKieiKeaxaxcx;)" in carrying it out (XLIV 18-20, 22-27). It is useful to
highlight some relevant aspects of this enieiiceia.
Sentimental interpreters of the Aeneid tend to forget that the epic is
about war: Arma is its first word, followed by predictions that bellum
ingens geret Italia (1. 263) and of bella, horrida bella (6. 86). War is the
action of Books 7-12, the mains opus. It was well recognized, however,
that war, besides its own fury, also had its nomoi, hence Philodemus'
censure of the warrior, full of "empty" rage, who is oQi^ioxoc, (XLIV 24).
We find more discussion of this, against a considerable background of
earlier debate, in authors such as Diodoms and Polybius: "All war," as the
former puts it, "having overstepped ta vo^ijia Kal SiKaia tcov dvGpomtov
all the same has its own laws, such as not breaking a tmce, killing a herald,
or exacting vengeance from someone who has placed himself under the
protection (niaxiv) of one who has overpowered him."^ The breaking of
truces—and Tumus has broken two—is reasonable and fair grounds for
revenge. Connected with it is the concept offides. In contrast to dementia,
^ For previous interpretations of the passage, see P. Fedeli, Properzio. II libra terzo delle
c/€pi«(Bari 1985) 643 f.
D.S. 30. 18. 2. See F. Kiechle, "Zur Humanitat der Kriegsfiihrung in den griechischen
Staaten," Historia 7 (1958) 129-56. For a general treatment of the dimensions of war in
Vergil, cf. R. F. Glei, Der Voter der Dinge: Interprelationen zur politischen, Uterarischen und
kullurellen Dimension des Krieges bei Vergil (Trier 1991).
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it is not just a vague moral standard but, being more normative, entails a
specific legal obligation,^^ in this case that of Aeneas towards the Arcadians
and, not in the least, towards his son. This is part of the dialogic situation
—
and I will return to it shortly— into which Vergil places the reader: What if
Turnus were spared? What would be Ascanius' potential fate in case
Aeneas were soon to die? Vergil raises the issue by an appeal to the
"implied reader" at 12, 456 and there can be little doubt about the answer.^^
It is another salutary reminder that we cannot approach the Aeneid from a
perspective of comfortable hindsight. Instead, we are present at creation
and that should be our primary horizon of expectations.
Nor should the expectation be that Vergil simply follows Philodemus.
As stated earlier, De Ira is an argumentative, heuristic tract; the line, e.g.,
between the three epilogismoi at the end and their refutation (XLVI 16-L 8)
is easily blurred.^* The third of these arguments, to give but one example,
states in essence that the degree of one's anger depends on one's
acquaintance with, or "mental notions" {\>noXi\\fz\<^ of, the damage that is
inflicted. The wise man, therefore, "being injured by someone intentionally,
understands correctly that he is harmed, but just to the extent that he has
been actually harmed, then of course he will be angered, but briefly, because
he never receives an impression of being greatly harmed, as he never takes
any external thing to be all that important" (XLVII 32-41). The refutation
is that such an argument is inconclusive (dcTtepavtoc;) because "it does not
follow for the person who has established that 'anger follows upon the
notion of having been injured and cannot occur otherwise' that 'he who has
received an impression of being injured will in every case be angered,'
unless someone demonstrates in addition that the notion that one is injured
is an (infallibly) efficient cause (SpaatiKov a'ltiov) of anger" (XLIX 39-L
8). The scene in the Aeneid agrees more with the stated argument than with
its refutation: Aeneas is roused to anger by the acquaintance with a
previous hurt, and his anger, based on a true impression,^' can be expected
to be brief. But Vergil parts company with the view shared by both
Philodemus and his antagonist that all such matters are external and
therefore unimportant.
The Aeneid is one of the most nuanced works of ancient literature and
the differentiations in the treatment of anger especially in Peripatetic and
Epicurean philosophy therefore were most congenial. They enabled the
^* The most recent discussion is D. Norr, Aspekte des romischen Volkerrechts: Die
Broraetafel von Alcantara, ABAW phil-hisL Klasse, N.F. 101 (1989) esp. 102 ff.
2^ See R. J. Rowland. "Ductor Rhoeteius: VergU. Aeneid 12. 456." in R. M. Wilhelm and H.
Jones (eds.). The Two Worlds of the Poet: New Perspectives on Vergil (Detroit 1992) 237-43.
Cf. Philodemus' argument that the wise man will resort to anger in order to forestall an
aggressor or to save a friend from being harmed (XL 26-XLI 8. 17-19).
An imperfect excuse, to be sure, for my earlier misreadings ([above, note 4] 336).
^' As Prof. Armstrong points out, the phrase 6paoxiK6v amov is a unique occurrence in
Philodemus and requires more explanation. Cf. R. Philippson, "Philodems Buch fiber den
Zom. Ein Beitrag zu seiner Wiederherstellung und Auslegung," RhM 71 (1916) 460.
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poet to recast a standard heroic emotion in a far more subtle way. In the
final scene, the process begins with Turnus' plea (12. 931-37). Tumus is
not a villain pure and simple—we are meant to empathize with him in the
nightmare simile (12. 908-14)—but a believable human character.^^ who
will always proclaim one thing, and then do another when the pressure is
on. Right to the end: Equidem merui nee deprecor, he begins his plea.
Pace R. D. Williams, deprecor certainly does not mean simply "complain,"
but, quite literally, "beg off." Turnus denies that he does so, but it is of
course exactly what he does. In the same vein, he ends his plea by putting
words in Aeneas' mouth by suggesting that Aeneas acts out of odium.
Odium, in all the philosophies, is different from ira saidfuror in that it is a
perpetual inclination.^' So Tumus remains true to his character until the
end. He will not change. We are meant to recall the salient scenes, such as
his caedis insana cupido (10. 760) driving him on while he was forgetting
to open the Trojan camp to his men, thereby prolonging the war, ultimately
losing it, and causing hundreds and thousands of unnecessary deaths. What
would he do to a future society that is based on a higher degree of social
responsibility? Parcere suibiectis, therefore, does not amount to a blanket
amnesty: "Externas gentes, quibus tuto ignosci potuit, conservare quam
excidere malui."^^
The dialogue continues, not only between the two protagonists, but
between the text and the reader. It is typical of Vergil's intentions (I use
this term unashamedly) that he does not end his epic, in contrast to the Iliad,
with an "aesthetic resolution. "^^ Instead, life is complex and we see Aeneas
once more in the throes of a dilemma. So we are asked to join him and the
poet in sorting out the various possibilities and alternatives. Can Tumus be
spared? Why not? Would a happy ending make the Aeneid more
meaningful? Should Aeneas act with or without strong emotions? Is anger
appropriate or is it not? Are any of these altematives better or would they
diminish the meaning of the work?
Vergil could have made it easy for himself when he wrote the ending of
the Aeneid. We can be grateful to him that he did not. I am glad the Aeneid
was written by him and not by his critics, because it would have been a
vastly impoverished, one-dimensional epic. Instead, the final scene is a
paradigm of many others and of his epische Technik in general: There is a
plethora of evocations and associations. There is a constant dialogue with
the reader to explore the limits of these associations, including, of course,
the relevant Homeric scenes, and to propose, evaluate, and reject possible
altematives. The process involves both our intellects and our emotions. It
^° See my remarks in Augustan Age 7 (1987) 169-72.
^' Cf. Cic. Tusc. 4. 21: odium ira inveterala. As such it would be, in Philodemus'
terminology, na^novtipoc; 6id6eoi^.
^^Res Gestae 3. 2. Cf. Cic. Off. 1. 35.
" Cf. J. Redfield. Nature and Culture in the Iliad (Chicago 1975) 218.
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is a remarkable polyphony, but it is by no means aimless or open-ended.
There is a strong authorial and moral center, which in Ovid yields to the
mere bravura of the narrator. The parallels between Vergil's procedure and
what Paul Zanker has called "Andachtsbild" in Augustan art are not
coincidental.^
Let me conclude by giving one more example of an association that
may be operative in the context of the final scene of the Aeneid. Aeneas
now has taken the place of Achilles, avenging his slain comrade. At the
same time, and chiefly by a more nuanced presentation of his anger, Vergil
portrays Aeneas as being very different from Achilles. There was a
contemporary of Vergil who, on a momentous occasion, had invoked
Achilles as an exemplar for the revenge he was seeking. That was
Octavian, who did so during his first appearance in Rome after Julius
Caesar's assassination (Appian, BC 3. 46 f.). The monument to this private
revenge was to be the Temple of Mars Ultor (Ovid, Fasti 5. 569 f.). As
time went on, this private aspect of ultio was complemented with a public
one: the revenge on the Parthians (Ovid, Fasti 5. 579-98) that was
consummated by their return of the Roman standards in 20 B.C., the year
before Vergil's death. Similarly, Aeneas' ultio in the final scene is both
private and public.^^ It involves the obligation to Evander and Pallas, and it
is ultio foederis rupti. Now when Ovid describes that temple in the Fasti,
he characterizes it in Vergilian terms: It is Augustus' maius opus (Fast. 5.
568). And he deliberately recalls the words Vergil's Aeneas uses before he
kills Tumus: scelerato sanguine. Octavian, Ovid says, called on Mars, ades
et satia scelerato sanguineferrum (5. 575), "help me and satiate my sword
with the criminal blood [of Caesar's murderers]." Was this insatiate?
Definitely not: Ovid says that Octavian did so with pia arma (569) and
milite iusto (571), with pietas and iustitia.^ Ovid, as many of us know who
have written on both him and Vergil, was the most astute commentator
Vergil ever had, and I think we should consider his words carefully.^^
The University of Texas at Austin
^ Cf. my discussion of "Venus, Polysemy, and the Ara Pacis Auguslae," AJA 96 (1992) 457
ff., esp. 474 f.
^ This is one of the few instances where these temis, which have been used far too often
and far too schematically in recent writings on Vergil, have some validity; as can be seen, they
are complementary rather than dichotomous on such occasions.
^^ For similar reasons, Vergil calls Aeneas pius amidst his slaughter of opponents after
Pallas' death (10. 591; cf. 783): His war is still bellumpium et iustum.
^^ Which does not mean, to comment on yet another horse that should be dead (see now P.
White, Promised Verse: Poets in the Society ofAugustan Rome [Cambridge, MA 1993]), that
Ovid and Vergil followed Augustan "propaganda" or "ideology." It is useful to observe the
distinction between these concepts (which, moreover, are rarely defined in Augustan
scholarship) and "topicality," a distinction made, e.g., by numismatists; see C. H. V.
Sutherland, The Emperor and the Coinage (London 1976) 99-101 and W. HoUstein, Die
stadtromische Miinzprdgung der Jahre 78—50 v. Chr. zwischen politischer Aktualitdt und
Familienthematik (diss. Marburg 1991).
